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Abstract
Information security has become an increasingly
important aspect in companies and households during
this time of digitalization. Cyber attacks and
especially ransomware attacks are a growing threat.
How people react to and perceive this threat is a
central component of this study. This paper is meant
to investigate how threat and efficacy influence
individuals’ information security behavior. For this
purpose, a structural equation model was developed
using the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM).
The results show that participants who received a low
threat message in their ransom demand were less
afraid and more likely to deal with the issue. At the
same time, they were not as confident as people who
perceived a significant threat. Participants who felt
that they had little adequate protection against
ransomware were more fearful and therefore dealt
with the topic more defensively. Conversely, they also
had the intention to behave safely.

1. Introduction
Information technology is being used both
professionally and privately, so the danger of security
attacks is omnipresent [1]. This study examines the
extent to which individuals can be motivated to protect
their data and prevent attacks. Some of such attacks,
called fear appeals, involve persuasive messages,
which include plausible threats. These fear appeals are
mainly used in the healthcare industry [2]. In the
relevant academic literature, fear appeals are often
used to describe negative consequences and thus
reduce undesired behavior [2]. The use of fear appeals
is widespread in research, and such messages are
widely believed to be more effective achieving a
security threat [2], [3]. The German Federal Office for
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Information Security assumes that severe threats are
mostly posed by ransomware attacks, which cost 8
billion dollars worldwide in 2017 [4]. One of the most
well known ransomware types is WannaCry, which
caused enormous global damage estimated at several
hundred million to four billion dollars [4]. WannaCry
attacked more than 200,000 computers in 150
countries [4]. Such ransomware attacks can lead to,
among other things, data loss due to access by third
parties [5]. Users can be motivated to protect their data
from such attacks to mitigate ransomware threats and
ensure information security behavior. Two common
methods to encourage users to increase their data
security and be less afraid of ransomware attacks are
creating backups and using antivirus scanners [5].
However, past research in the field of information
security compliance behavior shows that technical
measures alone are not sufficient to guarantee
information security. Primarily because security
attacks are mainly targeted at the weakest link in the
security chain, it is even more important to take a
socio-technical approach and implement behavioral
measures to minimize individuals’ non-secure
behavior [6].
The literature on information security compliance
behavior research often used and defined fear appeal
as follows: When a person is confronted with such
threats, assessment mechanisms are triggered, leading
to certain behavior in the given situation and deciding
whether the person protects their security. One theory
that explains the influence of these messages is Witte’s
[7] Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM), which
is often used in health-related contexts [7]–[10]. The
EPPM includes components of other established
approaches for explaining such behavior-oriented
decision-making processes, such as the Protection
Motivation Theory (PMT) [11]–[13] and the fear
control framework, according to Leventhal [14]. The
EPPM is intended to prevent the protection or
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defensive motivation process from being considered
alone in the PMT or the fear control framework and
provides a more holistic view on the decision-making
process [15].
Looking at the context of the behavior-specific
effects of ransomware on individuals, no explanations
that describe the behavior of individuals when
confronted with ransomware can be identified so far.
Although there are technical measures to avoid
ransomware, approaches to avoid the effectiveness of
ransomware from a social-behavioral perspective,
which aims to increase awareness and behavior
towards a security threat through ransomware, are still
missing. This paper aims to contribute to an
explanation of the problem and examines the
following research question:

presented in chapter five. This is followed by
evaluating the results and the subsequent discussion in
chapter six, which includes implications and
limitations. We conclude our study in chapter seven.

RQ: How do fear appeals influence users’ intentions
to change their information security behaviors in
ransomware?

In a basic definition, fear appeals can be described
as convincing messages aimed at frightening people.
This is to be achieved by describing the terrible things
that will happen to a person if they act contrary to the
message sent by the fear appeal [16]. A fear appeal
message is intended to get a person to change their
behavior because of fear. Fear appeals generally
consist of three elements: Fear, threat, and
effectiveness. The result of a fear appeal is the
acceptance of a message, which is defined as a change
of attitude, intention, or behavior [12]. Fear appeal is
relevant in our context because it initiates message
transmission and is the trigger for consideration and
causes a specific behavior. In this context, a threat
represents an external stimulus that exists
independently of an individual's perception. If an
individual perceives the threat, it can be said that the
individual is aware of a threat. When a fear appeal is
constructed, it is designed to convey first that there is
a threat to an individual, and second, to show its
severity and the vulnerability of the individual to the
threat. From the fear appeal, the considered individual
should derive the threat severity and the perceived
vulnerability to the threat. In the considered behavioral
formation process, as soon as a person is aware of a
threat, the convictions about the severity of the threat
and the probability of personally experiencing the
threat also build up. In addition to a threat, the
individuals’ efficacy also influences the behavioral
development process, triggered by a fear appeal [12].
The construct efficacy can be distinguished
between response efficacy and self-efficacy [16].
Response efficacy is the extent to which a person
believes a measure is effective against a threat. If a
person does not believe a measure to be successful,
they are less willing to adopt a behavior against it [17].
Self-efficacy is the degree to which a person believes
in their ability to perform an action against a threat

Our findings yield important insights for theory
and practice. From a theoretical point of view, we
provide the first approach to explain ransomware
security behavior and provide a starting point for
further theoretical consideration of one of the most
current and dangerous security risks. The EPPM
model lends itself to our approach, because it uses
well-known constructs to explain threat and coping
appraisals and associates them in context with both
behavioral intention and defensive avoidance.
Although current information security research
focuses on the connection between threat, coping
appraisals and behavioral intention, a connection with
fear and defensive avoidance in a unified context and
model is missing [6], [9]. Additionally, practitioners,
such as information security managers, can use our
results to develop measures against ransomware’s
effectiveness and meet the need for socio-technical
measures in this area. Private individuals receive
advice from our results on how they can better protect
themselves against ransomware.
We investigated the stated question by
implementing an empirical research design based on
an EPPM model adapted for our context. We collected
data from a sample of 507 German participants to
analyze our research model using Partial Least
Squares (PLS) structural equation modeling.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
After the introduction, the theoretical foundation is
explained in chapter two. Afterward, we provide an
overview of the EPPM. Next, our hypotheses and the
research model are introduced in chapter three. After
explaining our methodology in chapter four, the
structural model and measurement of this study are

2. Theoretical background
The following section outlines the relevant
theoretical foundation for the study. First, fear appeal
and the extended parallel process model are explained.
Next, the practical context is described, declaring
ransomware as an information security threat.

2.1. Fear appeal and the extended parallel
process model

Page 6692

[11]. The term self-efficacy thus refers to a person's
perceived competence. In information security, people
with a high degree of self-efficacy are more willing to
implement security measures [17].
Various approaches describe the relationships
between fear appeal, efficacy, and threat and their
dependence on behavior formation in the existing
literature. One of the models is the PMT by Rogers
[18]. The PMT is divided into three phases [19]. In the
first phase, information is obtained related to fear
appeal and experiences with the danger. The second
phase is the cognitive mediating process. This process
is divided into two components: Threat assessment
and coping assessment [19]. The last phase is coping,
in which the behavioral intention is examined [19].
The advantage of PMT is that it is a widely used model
among researchers for the influence of anxiety attacks
[11]. Another model is the Parallel Response Model
[14]. In this model, it is assumed that communication
causes fear on the one hand and persuasion on the
other hand. It should be noted that fear does not
generate persuasive power. The theory focuses on the
factors that lead to mastery of the information process,
such as behavior that causes fear [14]. In addition, with
its fear and coping reactions, one’s organism can also
serve as information that influences individual
decisions [14]. Different sources of information can,
therefore, provoke particular behavior patterns at
certain times [14].
An extended model for explaining fear appeals and
their impact on behavior is the EPPM. The model
describes a combination of the danger control/fear
control framework of Leventhal [14] with some
elements of Rogers’ [18], [19] original PMT [16].
These are subdivided into self-efficacy, response
efficacy, susceptibility, and severity. These
components are perceived and evaluated by the
recipient. Self-efficacy describes the expectation of a
person to carry out desired actions successfully based
on their competencies, while response effectiveness
refers to a person's beliefs about whether or not an
action actually averts a threat. Susceptibility refers to
the subjective perception of a risk for a perceived
threat’s negative impact, while severity describes the
perceived threat's severity. Depending on the degree
of perceived efficacy and perceived threat, there are
several possible outcomes. If the perceived threat and
perceived self-efficacy are high, this leads to
protection motivation and adaptive changes. This
process is called threat control [16]. When the threat is
high, but the response efficacy to the threat is low, the
message leads to anxiety control processes that cause
maladaptive changes. If the threat is low, there is no
response because no fear has been generated.
According to the EPPM model, the higher the threat,

the greater the evoked fear, the more attention the
message attracts, and the more the message is
integrated into the behavioral education process [16].
The process is as follows. First, the message and the
threat are evaluated. If the resulting fear is high, the
individuals’ efficacy is also evaluated. The fear
control process and the threat control process run
simultaneously. The threat is not the decisive variable,
rather the threat’s efficacy, since it determines which
process will be dominant [16]. Threat control
processes are processes in which the individual
manages the threat by taking preventive measures to
reduce an event’s probability. In contrast, fear control
processes are primarily emotional processes in which
the individual only copes with their fear rather than
with the danger [16]. In our study’s framework, we use
the EPPM model, because it considers both protective
and maladaptive coping mechanisms compared to
PMT and the hazard control/anxiety control
framework, and thus describes the effects on fear
appeals in a holistic way. A maladaptive coping
mechanism, also called defensive avoidance, describes
how to avoid dealing with a stressor.

2.2 Ransomware as an information security
threat
According to relevant practice related literature,
ransomware is defined as follows: Ransomware
describes malware that restricts or prevents access to
data and systems and releases these resources only
against payment of a ransom. The name ransomware
is a nested word from the terms “ransom” and
"malware".” [5]
Ransomware enables third parties to block or
prevent system access or encrypt user data. Windows
systems are most often affected. The most common
attack vectors are attachments of spam emails and
“drive-by-attacks” using exploit kits (i.e., malware on
websites), USB sticks, and network drives [20].
According to a BSI survey, ⅓ of the companies
surveyed said they had been affected by at least one
ransomware incident in the last six months, with ¾ of
cases involving email attachments. The consequences
of ransomware, both in the private and business sector,
can be seen primarily in damage to the own reputation,
the loss of data and hardware, as well as monetary
damages [5]. Protection measures in organizations
include backing up relevant data, raising employees’
awareness of current attack methods (e.g., macros in
Microsoft Office documents), and using antivirus
scanners [21].
Existing research on information security behavior
does not yet consider ransomware, which leaves open
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potential for identifying socio-technical measures to
ensure information security regarding ransomware.

3. Research
development

model

and

hypotheses

The following research model (Figure 2) is based
on the EPPM [16] and the implementation of the work
of Birmingham et al. [8]. We adapted the model for
our research context of information security. The
threat construct consists of the mechanisms
susceptibility and severity, and the construct efficacy
can be further sub-conceptualized into self-efficacy
and response-efficacy. We adapted the original
constructs fear and defensive avoidance and adapted
the original construct intention into behavioral
intention related to ransomware.

this understanding, we propose the following
hypothesis:
H2: Threat has a positive effect on fear arousal.
The construct efficacy consists of two components,
self-efficacy and response efficacy [16]. The EPPM
shows that only efficacy determines whether the
danger control process or fear control process occurs
[16]. In precise terms, fear arousal increases when
efficacy is low in the fear control process [7]. One
explanation is that people might feel helpless or
incapable of opposing the threat [7], [22]. Therefore,
fear arousal is partly influenced by security
technologies’ level of security [13]. If people assume
that antivirus scanners and backups are not effective
against ransomware, fear arousal increases. Therefore,
we propose the following hypothesis:
H3: Efficacy has a negative effect on fear arousal.

Figure 1. Research Model
Based on Witte’s EPPM [16], we propose the
following five hypotheses.
As can be inferred from the EPPM [16], we
aggregate threat susceptibility and threat severity in
one measuring construct. Despite the dependence on
efficacy, regardless of whether the danger control
process or the fear control process initiates, the level
of perceived threat has, in both cases, an essential
influence on the intention to protect one’s security.
The perceived threat has an essential influence
because of the danger control process; in our case,
intention to take protective action only initiates when
the threat is sufficiently severe [16]. To ensure that
participants are offered an incentive to protect
themselves from ransomware, ransomware dangers
are emphasized in the case of a fear appeal with a high
threat. Thus, we suggest the following hypothesis:
H1: Threat has a positive effect on behavioral
intention.
In contrast to the PMT, the EPPM considers fear as
another variable [16]. The danger control process or
fear control process is initiated based on the fear
appeal’s efficacy. Efficacy should be low if threat
influences fear arousal. Nonetheless, fear cannot be
evoked if the threat condition is low, so a more
threatening fear appeal positively influences fear [16].
By illustrating the danger of ransomware, depending
on the degree of efficacy, fear can be aroused. With

In contrast to increased fear arousal due to lower
efficacy, fear appeals with high efficacy positively
influence intentions to behave securely if they are
sufficiently threatening. This hypothesis is supported
by Witte’s research on AIDS prevention [7]. Thus, the
danger control process initiates. Anderson and
Agarwal [23] indirectly support this hypothesis; they
found a significant positive effect on attitude, which
also significantly influences intention. An explanation
could be that there is a realistic possibility for a person
to oppose or prevent the threat if the danger is
significant enough to merit protection [16], [22]. More
specifically, this means that people are willing to
oppose a potential ransomware threat if the defense
measures are effective against it to protect themselves.
The individuals must also be confident that they can
protect themselves, as demonstrated by the ease of use
of protective measures with high efficacy in the fear
appeals [13]; therefore, we derive the following
hypothesis:
H4: Efficacy has a positive effect on behavioral
intention.
Fear can be described as an inner emotional
reaction with psychological and physiological
dimensions triggered by cognitive stimuli [22]. Fear
has been hypothesized to be aroused by fear appeals
with high threat and low efficacy. Fear was found to
have a significant positive effect on avoidance [24].
Hence, fear is referred to as a driver [14]. When
transferred to the EPPM, the fear control response
follows the fear control process’ initiation [22].
Defensive avoidance is denying or blocking
confrontation with the threat [7], [24]. This defensive
avoidance can reduce the feeling of discomfort [24].
To reduce the uncomfortable feelings, individuals will
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avoid information about the potential dangers of
ransomware, in case of a positive influence of fear on
defensive avoidance. Contrarily, Birmingham et al.
[8], who also examined fear appeals in a health-related
context, demonstrated that fear has a significant
negative effect on defensive avoidance. Despite the
contradictory results of the influence of fear on
defensive avoidance, we offer the following
hypothesis:
H5: Fear arousal has a positive effect on defensive
avoidance.

4. Methodology
An intervention design using two independent
variables was developed to test the proposed
hypotheses in an online survey. The independent
variables were manipulated and randomly assigned to
the participants [25]. In the following sections, we
describe the data collection of the sample and the
research design, and the measurement of the variables.

4.1 Research design
To test our hypotheses, we manipulated the
independent variables to correspond to the following
conditions: high vs. low threat and high vs. low
efficacy. It is important to note that the participants
always received a message that expresses threat in
combination with a message that expresses efficacy.
The following possible combinations were shown to
the participants by means of randomization: high
threat/ high efficacy (HT/HE), high threat/ low
efficacy (HT/LE), low threat/ high efficacy (LT/HE),
and low threat/ low efficacy (LT/LE). The information
that was displayed to the participants in the survey is
shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Intervention messages
Low
Threat

Attacks by ransomware like WannaCry can
cause economic damage. Ransomware is
malicious software that restricts or prevents
access to data and systems and only releases
them against a ransom payment. The
damaged parties can, therefore, be deprived
of data. Ransomware attacks account for only
7% of all malware attacks worldwide. In
addition, a sharp decline in ransomware
attacks has been observed since 2018.

High
Threat

Attacks by ransomware like WannaCry have
caused economic damage of more than eight
billion dollars worldwide in 2017. This
damage amounts to millions in Germany
itself. Ransomware is the term used to
describe malware that restricts or prevents
access to data and systems and only releases
them against a ransom payment. The
damaged parties can, therefore, be deprived
of essential data. The formation of new types
of ransomware can lead to new methods of
attack. Therefore, there is no reason to sound
the all-clear regarding ransomware attacks.
Low
Possible measures effective against other
Efficacy malware, such as regular updates or the use
of antivirus programs, are not always
sufficient against ransomware. 86% of
ransomware could not be detected by the
standard antivirus program (Windows
Defender) in a simulation test. Ransomware
attacks can block access to the backups of
data (backup copies). Due to new
possibilities to smuggle ransomware into the
system, it is harder or even impossible for
antivirus programs to detect it.
High
Essential to protect oneself from ransomware
Efficacy attacks is antivirus programs, as they have a
detection rate of up to 96%. Antivirus
programs are designed to prevent malicious
programs from running on the computer. The
Federal Office for Information Security also
expressly recommends preventive measures
such as regular updates and backups of data
(backup copies). In just under 7 out of 10
cases, the data blocked by ransomware can
be made accessible again through backups.
The measures mentioned above can be
implemented quickly and easily.
The low threat condition was designed to convince
participants that the threat was trivial [15], i.e., that
ransomware was not a severe threat. Contrarily, the
high threat condition convinced the participants that
they were at significant risk due to the ransomware’s
omnipresent danger. In the low efficacy condition, we
based our manipulation on the assertion that a threat
cannot be averted [15], i.e., measures against
ransomware are ineffective. In the high efficacy
condition, we manipulated efficacy, so participants
believed that they could effectively avert a threat, so
measures against ransomware are successful [15]. All
four intervention messages were approximately the
same length.
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4.2 Data collection and sample

5. Data analysis and results

We collected data among participants through an
online survey. The participants consisted of people
who work with a computer in their daily work (or
private) lives. The questionnaire was translated from
English into German in order to ensure
comprehensibility for the participants. An overview of
the English questions is provided in the appendix. In
addition to the intervention messages that describe
threat and efficacy, manipulation checks were carried
out, and we included questions on three constructs
relevant to our study context. Participants were
introduced to the scenario, after which we included
attention checks to make sure the participants read and
understood the intervention message. The behavioral
intention (BI) scale we used is based on the research
of Johnston and Warkentin [11], Workman et al. [26],
and Ng et al. [27]. The defensive avoidance (DA) and
fear arousal (FEAR) items were adapted from
Birmingham et al. [8]. The questions were adapted to
the context of ransomware. Additional variables we
collected include Johnston and Warkentin’s [11]
general questions on information security and
demographic questions. We used a five-point Likert
scale to measure our items. Last, we ensured that the
participants were debriefed about ransomware’s real
danger and the possibility to oppose it. The debriefing
was executed through a text, which contained all
information on efficacy and threat, in contrast to the
partial information in the intervention messages.
Furthermore, we conducted a preliminary study with
12 subjects (8 complete responses) to check our
questionnaire’s consistency and make sure that the
participants perceive the right levels of threat and
efficacy in the questionnaire.
578 German participants took part in our study that
we ran from July to August 2019. Among these
answers, 507 were complete and valid answers, which
were used for the evaluation. Of these, 58.6% were
female, 40.4% male, and 1% other. The average age of
the participants was 25.6 years. Most participants hold
a bachelor's degree (37.9%) or completed high school
(32.4%). Furthermore, most participants were young
professionals with 1-2 years of work experience
(25.4%). This implies that our participants are subject
to threats by ransomware in corporate and/or private
settings. The distribution of the participants across the
four groups was approximately equal (HT/HE: n= 122,
HT/LE: n = 130, LT/HE: n = 124, LT/LE: n = 131).

A Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) approach
was used to evaluate the data. It allows testing and
evaluating hypothesis-based causal relationships [28].
Information systems, as well as several other research
disciplines have applied the variant-based Partial
Least Square (PLS) method. The SEM technique is
also particularly well suited for the current research, as
it allows multiple relationships between latent
variables to be measured with multiple indicators [29].
Moreover, the paths for measuring the latent variables
and the hypothetical relationships between the latent
variables can be estimated simultaneously.

5.1. Measurement validation
There are two independent variables for the model
to be examined: threat and efficacy. These
independent variables are manipulated in the study and
are, therefore, binary variables (0 or 1). In addition,
reflective relationships of the variables fear,
behavioral intention, and defense avoidance were
modeled. It was found that all elements load and
internal consistencies of the reflectively modeled
constructs are above the limit of 0.7. The only
exclusions are the second and third elements of the
defense avoidance construct (see appendix). These
were removed due to the limit of 0.7 not being reached.
The criteria of composite reliability (CR) and
extracted mean variance (AVE) are shown in table 2.
They are used to assess the reliability and validity of
the construct. The requirements are met if all
constructs evaluate CR values higher than 0.7, and
AVE values higher than 0.5 [30]. The requirements for
both criteria are met because all CR values are well
above the limit of 0.7, while all AVE values also reach
the limit of 0.5. By comparing the AVE’s square root
with the correlations between the constructs, Fornell
and Larcker offer an approach to assess discriminatory
validity. The comparison shows that all constructs
retain a higher value for the AVE’s square root than
for the correlation with other constructs [31].
Table 2. Construct validation
AVE

CR

EF

TA

FEAR BI

EF

n.a.

n.a.

1

TA

n.a.

n.a.

-.002

1

FEAR

.780

.946

-.126

.162

.883

BI

.702

.934

.130

.163

.212

.838

.674

.796

-.026

-.042

.316

-.020

DA

DA

.821

EF = Efficacy; TA = Threat; FEAR = Fear Arousal, BI = Behavioral Intention;
DA = Defense Avoidance
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A significant effect was found for all hypotheses.
It was found that threat (.163; significant at .01) has a
significant positive effect and efficacy (.126;
significant at .01) has a significant negative effect on
fear. In turn, fear has a significant positive effect on
defense avoidance (.319; significant at .01). A
significant positive effect of threat (.163; significant at
.01) and efficacy (.131; significant at .01) on
behavioral intention was also observed.

5.2 Hypotheses testing
The PLS method was used for estimation to test the
theoretical structural model described above. A 5000sample bootstrapping resampling method was used to
assess the significance of the paths. The estimation of
the path model is shown in figure 2 for the relevant
paths. From these results, it can be concluded that we
find support for the basic structure of the theory.

Threat
.161**

Efficacy

Behavioral
Intention

.163**

-.126**

Control Variables

.131**

Fear

.319**

Defense
Avoidance

•
•
•
•

Age
•
Gender
Education •
Job Level

Perceived
Threat
Perceived
Efficacy

Figure 2. Structural model with path coefficients
Note: ** significant at .01

Additionally, the following control variables were
used: age, gender, educational level, job level, threat,
and efficacy. Except for threat on defense avoidance (
-.091 significant at .01), these control variables had no
significant influence. In summary, all proposed
hypotheses are supported.

6. Discussion and summary of findings
The following is a summary of the results.
Moreover, the implications for theory and practice are
reviewed. Afterward, the limitations of the work and
possibilities for future research are discussed.

6.1. Summary of findings
The paper examines how the EPPM with its
constructs threat and efficacy in ransomware can be
used to influence fear and thereby, defense avoidance
and the behavioral intention to behave securely. Thus,
an understanding of how the EPPM works in the
context of ransomware and whether it is applicable is
developed. It can be summarized that threat and
efficacy positively influence behavioral intention, i.e.,
participants who have been positively influenced by
these two constructs tend to behave more securely.
Contrarily, the positive effect of threat and the
negative effect of efficacy on fear result in defensive

avoidance, i.e. participants tend take no action. In
summary, one can say that this is a current and highly
relevant topic with high practical relevance. The
effects of the EPPM have already been investigated in
various contexts, but have never been investigated in
the context of ransomware. Therefore, this paper
presents both theoretical and practical implications.
However, this paper is not free of limitations, which,
at the same time, provide opportunities for future
research.

6.2. Implications for theory and contributions
to literature
This study provides a theoretical contribution by
testing the EPPM in the context of ransomware. This
should lead to a better understanding of how the EPPM
works in the new context. The EPPM was shown
through Witte [7] to influence fear, defense avoidance,
and behavioral intention [25]. Our results suggest that
some of the suggestions of the EPPM from different
use cases can be transferred to information security
and especially to ransomware. One of these arguments
is that fear attacks with high threat levels lead to a
higher fear level. The fear of ransom demands is
increasing. Additionally, a higher threat also leads to a
higher intention to change behavior positively.
Therefore, it is also an incentive for individuals to
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protect themselves from ransom demands. This
positive change is also called acceptance of the
message [7]. Constructive effectiveness also leads to a
higher intention to change behavior, as Witte [7]
proposed. Besides, we found that efficacy’s effect on
fear is negative, matching Witte’s research [16]. In
comparison with existing information security
literature, similar results can be seen. In our work, we
found similar effects for the influence of threat and
efficiency on behavioral intention, like Vance et al.
[32]. However, in contrast to other research, we found
significant effects between susceptibility, severity,
self-efficacy and behavioral intention in our EPPM
model, in contrast to the model of Menard et al [33].
Furthermore, effectiveness has a strong influence on
the intention to implement information security
measures. People are willing to take security
measures, such as saving backups and using antivirus
scanners. This suggests that people will be more
concerned about their data security and are confident
that they can do so. It will allow us to expand the
existing literature on the EPPM and its impact. This
could be achieved by investigating, through
experimental research, how behavioral intention, fear,
and thus defense avoidance can be influenced in the
case of ransomware, complementing the existing
security literature. It can illustrate how further
research can explain the constructs threat and efficacy,
such as helping companies define communication
strategies for data security. It is also essential that
research and practice address the problem, as
ransomware is becoming an increasingly relevant
issue, threatening companies and individuals [17].
Moreover, both companies and private individuals
incur unplanned costs after a ransomware attack,
which could be reduced by appropriate practices [34].

6.3. Implications for practice
The results identified have practical relevance in
addition to the theoretical contribution. For example,
they can help companies optimize their future
corporate communication strategies regarding the
danger of ransomware. Companies can use our
findings to adapt their communication so that the best
possible results can be achieved even in the case of a
ransomware attack. The results can also provide
insights into how private individuals can be influenced
and warned about ransomware and how threat and
efficacy can influence people's fear and behavior. As
already mentioned, ransomware attacks can have fatal
consequences. Therefore, it is vital to investigate how
the consequences of ransomware attacks can be
reduced or even prevented. Our study’s results suggest
that by using a statement that conveys a high threat,

people have a higher intention to behave securely and
are more afraid of a ransomware attack, which leads to
a defensive attitude. If, however, the statement that
there are effective ways to protect themselves from the
threat is also included, the participants tend to have a
higher intention to behave securely again, and the fear
of the threat can be reduced, which leads to a less
defensive attitude. Accordingly, statements about
ransomware that are intended to reduce the danger
should always contain both aspects. This means that
individuals can tackle a high threat, in case they know
that there are effective mechanisms to protect oneself
from the threat of ransomware.

6.4. Limitations and future research
While our study yields important findings in
information security behavior, there are some
limitations we would like to address in the following.
Whereas information security is a concern to a broad
spectrum of the population, our results are based on
507 German participants, who have varying levels of
professional experience. Compared to other countries,
Germans seem to be more aware of cybercrime than
other Europeans [34] are. Therefore, considering
cultural differences might be insightful in future
research. We chose ransomware as a relevant
instantiation of information security threats and its
appeal to individuals’ efficacy because of its
prevalence [4]. However, ransomware is just one
variant of malware, including spyware, phishing,
botnets, worm-based attacks, or surveillance attacks
[35]. Additionally, specific information security
behaviors could be investigated. Some examples of
this are log-off/lock screen behavior [36] and the
opening of email attachments [37]. While we build on
the advantages of a controlled setting, in which we
were able to manipulate the amount of threat and
efficacy participants were exposed to, future research
could study actual user behavior.

7. Conclusion
This study deals with ransomware statements’
influence on people’s fear and behavior using the
EPPM. By formulating a research design that varies
the levels of the constructs threat and efficacy, 507
study participants were interviewed. The data set was
evaluated using a structural equation model. This
study’s results provide valuable insights into how fear
appeals in the form of threat and efficacy affect the
fear and behavior of individuals who may be
endangered by ransomware. The study shows that the
participants who were given a low threat message in
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their ransomware statement were less afraid and more
likely to deal with the issue. At the same time, they
were not as secure as people who had perceived a
significant threat. In addition, participants who felt
that they had little practical protection against
ransomware were more afraid and therefore tended to
be more defensive about the topic. However, they
simultaneously had the intention to behave securely.
In summary, it can be stated that the processes of the
EPPM help explaining individuals’ reactions when
facing the danger of ransomware.
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9. Appendix
Table 3. Operationalization of constructs
Fear Arousal [8]
I get very scared when I think that I might
be affected by ransomware.
When thinking about being affected by
ransomware, I get very worried.
I feel bad just thinking about the
possibility of being affected by
ransomware.
When I think about the possibility of
being affected by ransomware, I get a
bad feeling.
I fear being affected by ransomware.
Defense Avoidance [8]
I do not want to think about my risk of
being affected by ransomware.
I doubt if ransomware is a danger to me.
I do not want to protect myself from
ransomware actively.
I do not want to think about the
consequences of ransomware.
Behavioral Intention [11]
In order to protect myself against
ransomware, I intend to use antivirus
programs for the next 3 months actively.
In order to protect myself against
ransomware, I will probably use
antivirus programs in the next 3 months
actively.
In order to protect myself against
ransomware, I plan to use antivirus
programs in the next 3 months actively.
In order to protect myself against
ransomware, I plan to actively create
backups in the next 3 months.
In order to protect myself against
ransomware, I plan to create backups
within the next 3 months actively.
To protect myself against ransomware, I
plan to create backups in the next 3
months actively.

FEAR1
FEAR2
FEAR3
FEAR4
FEAR5
DA1
DA2
DA3
DA4
BI1
BI2

BI3
BI4
BI5
BI6
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